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WILLS-INTEGRATION-The requirement of formal attestation in
the English Statute of Frauds of 1678 and the Statute of Wills of 1837
gave rise for the first time to the necessity of placing all testamentary
dispositions in a single document. Prior to these statutes, all that had
been necessary was that wills be in writing and exhibit the testamentary
intent of the author. Therefore, plural writings, however inconsistent
or fragmentary they might have been, were necessarily parts of the
will to be given effect. No rules for integration were needed under
such loose requirepients of execution. Attestation under the Statute
of Frauds and the Statute of Wills caused integration to become an
indispensable element in the probate of separate sheets of paper as the
will of a testator, though no express legislative statement required such
integration.1 This same requirement of formal attestation in America

1 9 WxcMoRB, EVIDENCE,

3d ed., §2452 (1940).
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has compelled the integration of testamentary acts. It remains, however, universally permissible to write a will on several separate pages. 2
There is in no state a requirement that a will be written on a single
sheet, although the rules applfed to integration vary widely. It would
seem clear that a better practice would be for the testator to sign each
page, but it is not necessary that either he or the witnesses do so. In
fact, wills have been upheld where the attestation clause and the witnesses' signatures were on different sheets from that of the testator's
signature, even where space enough existed on the sheet signed by
the testator for the attestation clause and the signature of the witnesses;
or where the dispositive clauses of the will and the testator's signature
were on entirely separate pieces of paper.3
That danger exists in the admission to probate of wills written on
separate sheets of paper seems to be generally recognized by the courts,
but this possibility of alteration, interlineation and substitution is
treated with minor concern by the multitude of decisions dealing with
integration, and the statutes which give effect to the validity of such
wills make no me~tion of it whatsoever. 4 Therefore, there exists a
presumption that the form of a will found at the death of the testator
is that in which it was executed. Of course, this is a rebuttable presumption, and the attacking party may show that sheets have been
destroyed, rewritten, or transposed. 5
Helpful to a treatment of integration is a differentiation from the
doctrine of incorporation by reference. Unlike incorporation by reference, integration does not require any reference to another sheet
sought to be integrated in the executed sheet. The most important
role of integration comes into play when there is no reference to earlier
sheets, and thus, without integration, they could not be considered as
2 Sleeper v. Littlefield, 129 Me. 194, 151 A. 150, 71 A.L.R. 518 (1930); 30 A.L.R.
424 (1924); 11 BosT. UNIV. L. RBv. 148 (1931); 5 TEMPLE L.Q. 152 (1931); 17 VA.
L. RBv. 69 (1930); 39 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1060 (1912); 1 PAGE, WILLS §242 (1941).
8 10 A.L.R. 422 (1921); Re Estate of Moro, 183 Cal. 29, 190 P. 168 (1920).
4 In re Swaim's Will, 162 N.C. 213, 78 S.E. 72 (1913); Sleeper v. Littlefield, 129
Me. 194, 151 A. 150 (1930); Covington's Estate, 348 Pa. 1, 33 A. (2d) 235 (1943); 42
MICH. L. RBv. 725 (1942); 7 UNIV. DETROIT L.J. 101 (1944); 92 UNIV. PA. L. RBv.
217 (1943).
Ii 30 A.L.R. 418 (1924); 28 L.R.A. (n.s.) 270 (1910); 1 PAGE, WILLS §425 (1941);
Bond v. Seawell, 3 Burr. 1773, 97 Eng. Rep. 1092 (I 765); Hathaway v. Warren, 277
Mass. 161, 178 N.E. 288 (1931); Murphy v. Clancy, 177 Mo. App. 429, 163 S.W. 915
(1914); In re Deyton's Will, 177 N.C. 494, 99 S.E. 424 (1919); Goethe v. Browning,
146 S.C. 7, 143 S.E. 362 (1928); Sleeper v. Littlefield, 129 Me. 194, 151 A. 150, 71
A.L.R. 518 (1930).
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part of the will. 6 A further peculiarity of integration is the absolute
requirement that all sheets sought to be integrated be present in the
same room at the time of execution. 7 It is the general rule that witnesses need not have examined all the pages of the will when it was
being executed,8 and a presumption exists that all sheets were present. 9
By this comment, it is sought to summarize the conditions the courts
have placed on integration, and to discuss some of the special problems
incident to integrating separate sheets of paper.10

I. Conditions for Integration
Three criteria are commonly used by the courts in determining
whether or not integration is to be permitted. These are (1) physical
connection, (2) internal sense connection, and (3) extrinsic evidence
permitted to prove the existence at the time of execution, usually in
the absence of either physical or internal sense connection. All three
are methods by which the court attempts to establish the intent of the
testator that these sheets constitute a single will.11

I. Physical connection. This is the clearest case for permitting
several sheets to be integrated, and when the requirements of the particular jurisdiction have been met as to the degree of attachment necessary, integration is always allowed. A connection that does not allow
separation is always sufficient; however, a reasonable degree of permanence_will be adequate. 12 Among the various forms of attachment
that have been approved by the courts, the following are illustrative:
the fastening of three papers by eyelets at the top,1 3 pasting different
sheets together,14 or even sewing papers together with thread. 15 Ata Cole v. Webb, 220 Ky. 817, 295 S.W. 1035 (1927); Estate of Merryfield, 167 Cal.
729, 141 P. 259 (1914); Sleeper v. Littlefield, 129 Me. 194, 151 A. 150 (1930); In re
Swaim's Will, 162 N.C. 213, 78 S.E. 72 (1913); 25 CoL. L. fuv. 888 (1925).
7Bond v. Seawell, 3 Burr. 1773, 97 Eng. Rep. 1092 (1765); Harp v. Parr, 168 ill.
459, 48 N.E. 113 (1897); Ela v. Edwards, 16 Gray (82 Mass.) 91 (1860); Gass v. Gass,
3 Humph. (22 Tenn.) 278 (1842); Wikoff's Appeal, 3 Harris (15 Pa.) 281 (1850);
Sleeper v. Littlefield, 129 Me. 194, 151 A. 150 (1930).
8 Owen v. Groves, 145 Ga. 287, 88 S.E. 964 (1916); Dearing v. Dearing, 132 Va.
178, 111 S.E. 286 (1922).
9 See note 5 supra.
10 This comment does not include the extensive problem involved in the integration
of duplicate and partial wills. See 1 PAGB, WILLS §248 (1941); ATKINSON, HANDBOOK
oF THE LAw oF WILLS §§140 and 141 (1937).
1117 VA. L. fuv. 69 (1930).
12Hitchings v. Wood, 2 Moore P.C. 355, 12 Eng. Rep. 1041 (1841); Jones v. Habersham, 63 Ga. 146 (1879); Braddock's Goods, 1 Prob. Div. 433 (1876).
13 Re Estate of Moro, 183 Cal. 29, 190 P. 168 (1920).
14 Butler v. Moulton, 42 S.D. 410, 175 N.W. 701 (1920); Lamb v. Lippincott, ll5
Mich. 611, 73 N.W. 887 (1898); In re Collins, (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1879) 5 Red£. Sur. 20.
15 Bamewall v. Murrell, 108 Ala. 366, 18 S. 831 (1895).
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tachment has been made by pinning the sheets together,16 fastening
separate pieces of paper at one side by two metal staples,17 separate
sheets remaining a part of a pencil tablet connected at the top,18 attaching a codicil and attestation clause with a string,1 9 folding foolscap
paper together and tying in the form of a book, 20 and the binding of
pad pages together by pad glue. 21 Cancelled check stubs in a check
book were held to be sufficiently attached by one court,22 as was the
case of a cord or tape being run through an envelope containing a will
and the other end being attached by a seal to a "procotol" involved. 23
In many of these cases, internal sense and extrinsic proof contributed
to the outcome, but the physical attachment was of prime importance.
No matter how permanent the attachment may be, it will be insufficient
for integration where it is evident that the testator did not intend the
attached paper as a part of his will. 24

2. Internal sense connection. The courts have described this
means of discovering the testator's intent variously as the requirement
of coherence, internal sense, verbal unity, logical and grammatical
sequence, and by a host of other terms. Where there is sufficient internal sense connection to satisfy the particular court, just as in the
case of physical connection, all jurisdictions would allow integration.
The fact situation in which internal sense may be most easily found
is where the sentences or paragraphs on one sheet carry over without
interruption to another. 25 A particularly clear case for application of
this rule is also found when the testator has consecutively numbered
16 Braddock's Goods, 1 Prob. Div. 433. (1876); Re Will of Field, 204 N.Y. 448, 97
N.E. 881 (1912); 39 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1060 (1912).
17Whitney's Will, 90 Hun. 138, 35 N.Y.S. 798 (1895); Estate of Puckett, 240 Iowa
986, 38 N.W. (2d) 593 (1949).
1s Owen v. Groves, 145 Ga. 287, 88 S.E. 964 (1916).
19 Horsford's Goods, L.R. 3 Prob. & Div. 211, 44 L.J. (n.s.) (P.) 9, 31 L.T. (n.s.)
553, 23 Week. Rep. 211 (1874).
20 Gilman v. Gilman, (N.Y. Surr. 1861), 1 Redf. 354, affirmed in (N.Y. 1862), 38
Barb. 364.
21 Redden's Will, 185 Misc. 382, 56 N.Y.S. (2d) 751 (1945).
22 Shoemaker's Estate, (Pa. Orph. 1943), 47 D. & C. 337, 53 Dauph. 324.
23 Johnston v. King, 250 Ala. 571, 35 S. (2d) 202 (1948).
24 Keith's Estate, 173 Cal. 276, 159 P. 705 (1916); Baker's Estate, 331 Pa. 33, 200
A. 65 (1938). For cases where the physical connection was held inadequate, see: Bryen's
Estate, 328 Pa. 122, 195 A. 17 (1937); Sando's Estate, 362 Pa. 1, 66 A. (2d) 312 (1949);
In re Allen's Will, 282 N.Y. 492, 27 N.E. (2d) 22 (1939), reversing 257 App. Div. 718,
15 N.Y.S. (2d) 401, appeal granted 258 App. Div. 836, 16 N.Y.S. (2d) 693, reargument
denied 283 N.Y. 643, 28 N.E. (2d) 40.
25 Stanard v. Miller, 212 Ala. 605, 103 S. 594 (1925); Sleeper v. Littlefield, 129
Me. 194, 151 A. 150 (1930); In re Swaim's Will, 162 N.C. 213, 78 S.E. 72 (1913);
Bond v. Seawell, 3 Burr. 1773, 97 Eng. Rep. 1092 (1765); In re Redden's Will, 185 Misc.
382, 56 N.Y.S. (2d) 751 (1945).
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the paragraphs or the pages.26 Other examples of the many cases in
which this theory is given support are the following: separate sheets
were written in the testator's hand with the same ink, in addition to a
grammatical dependence of parts;27 several sheets were connected inherently by their composition;28 three sheets were folded together in
order, containing respectively the dispositive statements, the specific
devices and bequests, and the signatures of the joint testators. 29 The
internal sense connection was held adequate where the second and
third of three sheets were written nine years after the :6.rst and were
placed in proper and chronological sequence in an envelope.30 These
specific cases are strongly supported by the great number of cases where
the courts simply conclude that there existed continuity and coherence
of thought sufficient to permit integration. 31 Of course, physical connection of a sort may have been present in many of these cases, but
the internal sense was commanding and determinative in itself.

3. Extrinsic evidence permitted to prove the existence at the time
of execution, usually in the absence of either physical or internal sense
connection. The weight of American authority is in favor of this
approach in determining whether or not integration is to be allowed.
Oftentimes physical and internal sense connection will be part and
parcel of this theory, but the liberal allowance of extrinsic evidence
is a marked departure from the mechanical rules of either of the former
theories. The variety of cases and fact situations in which the courts
have permitted extrinsic evidence is exemplified in the following: one
of the witnesses himself took the sheets, folded and fastened them
together;32 witnesses proved two separate sheets as the will of the
26 Fisher's Estate, 283 Pa. 282, 129 A. 90 (1925); Sleeper v. Littlefield, 129 Me.
194, 151 A. 150 (1930).
27 Martin v. Hamlin's Exrs., 4 Stroh. 188, 53 Am. Dec. 673 (1850).
28 Hathaway v. Warren, 277 Mass. 161, 178 N.E. 288 (1931).
29 In re Covington's Estate, 348 Pa. 1, 33 A. (2d) 235 (1944).
30Jn re Dumas' Estate, 34 Cal. 406, 210 P. (2d) 697 (1949).
81 In re Puckett's Estate, 240 Iowa 986, 38 N.W. (2d) 593 (1949); In re Morrison's
Estate, 98 Cal. App. (2d) 380, 220 P. (2d) 413 (1950); Johnston v. King, 250 Ala. 571,
35 S. (2d) 202 (1948); Estate of Merryfield, 167 Cal. 729, 141 P. 259 (1914); Wikoff's
Appeal, 3 Harris (15 Pa.) 281 (1850); In re Tyrrell's Estate, 17 Ariz. 418, 153 P. 767
(1915); 14 MicH. L. REv. 522 (1916); Sellards v. Kirby, 82 Kan. 291, 108 P. 73 (1910);
25 CoL. L. REv. 879 (1925); 33 HARv. L. REv. 989 (1920); 33 YALE L.J. 793 (1924);
28 L.R.A. (n.s.) 270 (1910). For cases where the internal sense connection was held to
be inadequate, see: In re Davis's Estate, 344 Pa. 520, 26 A. (2d) 339 (1942); In re
Baldwin's Will, 95 P.L.J. 473, affd. 357 Pa. 432, 55 A. (2d) 263 (1947); In re Sando's
Estate, 362 Pa. 1, 66 A. (2d) 312 (1949); In re Fritz's Estate, 102 Cal. App. (2d) 385,
227 P. (2d) 539 (1951).
8 2 Jones v. Habersham, 63 Ga. 146 (1879).
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testator to which they had attested;33 the testator handed the separate
sheets to the witnesses at the time of subscription.34 In another case
the witness identified the sheets as the original ones where they were
not fastened properly together. 35 The facts of one case revealed that
neither physical nor coherent sense connection existed, but sufficient
credible parol proof of identity was available.36 Though coherence
established separate sheets as one instrument, the court said that identification by oral testimony that all pages were present at the time of
execution, or of accompanying circumstances, would also be controlling factors. 37 In still another case, parol evidence established that
the testatrix had written two separate papers and enclosed them together in an envelope in her trunk. 38 One court found both physical
and coherent connection present, but declared that far more important
was the testimony of two competent, disinterested, and unimpeached
witnesses.39 And, finally, where there was no physical or internal
sense connection, two witnesses testified that the testator had declared
the two pieces of paper as constituting his will.4° Thus, it is seen
from these cases, and others comparable, that the majority of the courts
will go beyond the requirement of a physical or internal sense connection, and will permit integration where sufficient extrinsic evidence is
present to indicate the intent of the testator. 41

II. Special Problems in Integration
Three special problems arise which are particularly demanding of
special consideration. These are (I) the integration of holographic
wills, (2) the integration of an envelope as a part of a will, and (3)
the problem of integration where statutes require that wills be signed
at the end.

I. The integration of holographic wills. Of the states where stat33 Martin v. Hamlin's Exrs., (S.C. Ct. of App. and Err. 1850), 4 Stroh. 188, 53 Am.
Dec. 673; Taylor v. Wardlaw, (N.Y. Surr. 1884) 3 Dem . .Sur. 48.
34 Ela v. Edwards, 16 Gray (82 Mass.) 91 (1860).
85Murphyv. Clancy, 177 Mo. App. 429, 163 S.W. 915 (1914).
36 Cole v. Webb, 220 Ky. 817, 295 S.W. 1035 (1927).
87 Sleeper v. Littlefield, 129 Me. 194, 151 A. 150 (1930).
38 Estate of Taylor, 126 Cal. 97, 58 P. 454 (1899).
89 In re Puckett's Estate, 240 Iowa 986, 38 N.W. (2d) 593 (1949).
40Estate of Swendsen, 43 Cal. App. (2d) 551, 111 P. (2d) 408 (1941).
41 In re Covington's Estate, 348 Pa. 1, 33 A. (2d) 235 (1943); Richardson v. Richardson, (S.C. Equity 1838) Dud. Eq. 184; Palmer v. Owen, 229 ill. 115, 82 N.E. 275
(1907); Owen v. Groves, 145 Ga. 287, 88 S.E. 964 (1916); In re Deyton's Will, 177 N.C.
494, 99 S.E. 424 (1919); In re Cook's Estate, 113 N.J. Eq. 225, 166 A. 32 (1933), affd.
118 N.J. Eq. 288, 179 A. 259; 99 A.L.R. 551 (1935); In re Kaiser's Estate, 150 Neb.
295, 34 N.W. (2d) 366 (1948).
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utes permit holographic wills, the majority require only that the will
be written in the hand of the testator, be dated, signed, and intended
by the testator as his last will and testament. The striking feature of
holographic wills is tliat no witnesses are needed. However, a signed
attestation clause will not invalidate the will, and beneficiaries who
have signed may testify as to the will without losing their legacies.42
Some statutes require that the will be found among the valuable papers
or effects of the testator, but in the absence of statute, the will may be
deposited anywhere. Thus, it may be seen that there is no· requirement of formal attestation and subscription, and though it has been
suggested that the imperativeness of having all pieces present at the
time of execution becomes moot,43 the courts which have dealt with the
problem would make such presence a prerequisite to integration.
A restriction is placed by some courts on the integration of separate
sheets of holographic wills in the requirement that the will be written
in a single transaction. 44 However, the view which is better considered,
and apparently the weight of authority, would permit any papers the
testator intended as a part of his will to be integrated, irrespective of
variations in the time and place of making.45
Of course, all the rules used in the application of the theories of
physical connection, internal sense, and extrinsic evidence to the integration of formally executed wills, likewise apply to the integration
of holographic wills with equal, if not greater, force. 46
Another important phase of the problem of integration of holographic wills is the question of whether or not an envelope containing
the holographic writing may be iptegrated with the enclosed papers
as a part of the will. In some jurisdictions the envelope and the separate sheets within are treated as individual pieces of paper and permitted to be integrated. 47 Even in these jurisdictions, it will depend
largely on what part of the will appears on the envelope, for if a
42 In re Morrison's Estate, 98 Cal. App. (2d) 380, 220 P. (2d) 413 (1950).
4317 VA. L. R:sv. 69 (1930).
44 Estate of Taylor, 126 Cal. 97, 58 P. 454 (1899); Lagrave v. Merle, 5 La. Ann. 278,
52 Am. Dec. 589 (1850).
45 In re Morrison's Estate, 98 Cal. App. (2d) 380, 220 P. (2d) 413 (1950); In re
Estate of Skerrett, 67 Cal. 585, 8 P. 181 (1885); In re Estate of Merryfield, 167 Cal. 729,
141 P. 259 (1914); Hays v. Marschall, 243 Ky. 392, 48 S.W. (2d) 540 (1932); Druen v.
Hudson, 17 Tenn. App. 428, 68 S.W. (2d) 146 (1933); In re Deyton's Will, 177 N.C.
494, 99 S.E. 424 (1919).
46 In re Morrison's Estate, 98 Cal. App. (2d) 380, 220 P. (2d) 413 (1950); In re
Dumas' Estate, 34 Cal. (2d) 406, 210 P. (2d) 697 (1949); In re Estate of Merry.field, 167
Cal. 729, 141 P. 259 (1914); Estate of Swendsen, 43 Cal. App. (2d) 551, Ill P. (2d)
408 (1941); Sleeper v. Littlefield, 129 Me. 194, 151 A. 150 (1930).
47 Alexander v. Johnston, 171 N.C. 468, 88 S.E. 785 (1916).
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statute requires that the testator sign at the end, it seems to be everywhere held that an envelope may not be integrated where all it contains on its face is the signature of the testator. 48 In the absence of a
statute, a proper inquiry would seem to be whether the testator intended that his name on the envelope was to be his signature,49 or only
a means of identifying the contents therein.

2. The integration of an envelope as a part of a will. Necessarily,
in the discussion of holographic wills, the problem of integrating holographic wills and the envelopes containing them has already been considered, but there remains the question of integrating envelopes with
formally executed wills. The same rules discussed under the integration of envelopes and their contents in holographic wills apply to
formally executed wills, including the requirement that the envelope
be present in the same room at the time of execution. In states where
statutes require that the testator sign at the end of the will, integration
would be denied in formally executed wills as in holographic writings
where the testator's signature appears only on the envelope.50 However, without such limiting statutes, there is authority that extrinsic
evidence would be allowed to show the intent of the testator in so
affixing his name.51 Where such proper intent can be found, it seems
likely that the attestation clause might appear separately on the envelope, the testator's name might appear alone on the envelope, or
even the name of the intended beneficiaries might be found alone
thereon. 52
3. Where statutes require that wills he signed at the end. In
addition to the previously discussed problem of integrating envelopes
with their contents, holographic or formally executed, where a statute
requires signing at the end, other difficulties in integration may arise
under such a statute. Where it is sought to integrate separate sheets
under a statute of this kind, the rule seems to be that the instrument
itself must indicate in some manner what the end of the will is to be
48 In re Poland, 137 La. 219, 68 S. 415 (1915); Succession of Armant, 43 La. Ann.
310, 9 S. 50, 26 Am. St. Rep. 183 (1891).
49 Alexander v. Johnston, 171 N.C. 468, 88 S.E. 785 (1916).
50 In re Seiter's Estate, 265 Pa. 202, 108 A. 614 (1919); 33 HARv. L. R.Ev. 989
(1920).
51 In the Goods of Mann, [1942] Prob. 146, [1942] 2 All E.R. 193; 16 AusT. L.J.
364 (1943); 11 FORDHAM L. R.Ev. 320 (1942); Estate of Bean, [1944] Prob. 83, 60 T.L.R.
418, in which the court distinguished the earlier case of In the Goods of Mann, saying
that in the former case it appeared that the intent of the testator was that his name on the
envelope be his signature; 18 AusT. L.J. 167 (1944); 9 CAMB. L.J. 126 (1945).
52 Fosselman v. Elder, 98 Pa. 159 (1881).
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in order to permit such integration. This indication may be found in
the physical connection of the sheets, the internal sense or coherence
of the pages, in a consecutive numbering of the paragraphs or pages,
, or some comparable method of deterrnination.53 Apparently in jurisdictions where this rule of signing at the end is in existence, extrinsic
evidence of what the testator intended will not be allowed to establish
the contemplated order of the sheets involved.54 This would go only
to the enforcement of the rule that the will be signed at the end, however, for it would still be permissible to admit parol evidence for proving
that the testator intended these separate sheets as his single testamentary
act. It has been suggested that very slight physical or internal sense
connection will satisfy the requirement of signing at the end, and the
cases seem to indicate that this may be so, declaring the statute satisfied
short of the requirements usually set for integration proper.55

III. Conclusion
It may be fairly concluded that there is a definite liberalizing tendency on the part of the courts as to what evidence may be shown in
support of integration. From the purely mechanical tests applied generally in the earlier decisions, the courts have advanced to a position
where almost any extrinsic evidence may be submitted to show the
intent of the testator. This liberal rule will, of course, be restricted
by statutes regulating form and execution, but as has been indicated,
slight evidence may satisfy the statutory requirements.
Though the Statute of Wills of 1837 does not specifically deal
with integration, it has been seen that the requirement of formal attestation caused the necessity for integration to come to the fore by
implication. To circumvent in part the effect of integration of a strict
application of the Statute of Wills, certain presumptions were developed at an early time.56 It is presumed, first, that all the sheets
53 In re Seiter's Estate, 265 Pa. 202, 108 A. 614 (1919); Wikoff's Appeal, 3 Harris
(15 Pa.) 281 (1850); Sellards v. Kirby, 82 Kan. 291, 108 P. 73 (1910); In re Fisher's
Estate, 283 Pa. 282, 129 A. 90 (1925); In re Maginn's Estate, 281 Pa. 514, 127 A. 79
(1924); 33 HARV, L. fuv. 989 (1920).
54 Wikoff's Appeal, 3 Harris (15 Pa.) 281 (1850); In re Maginn's Estate, 281 Pa.
514, 127 A. 79 (1924); In re Seiter's Estate, 265 Pa. 202, 108 A. 614 (1919); In re
Fisher's Estate, 283 Pa. 282, 129 A. 90 (1925); 33 HARv. L. R:Bv. 989 (1920).
55 Evans, "Incorporation by Reference, Integration, and Non-Testamentary Act," 25
CoL. L. R.Ev. 879 at 888 (1925); ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF WILLS §139,
p. 329 (1937).
56 25 CoL. L. R.Ev. 879 at 888 (1925); Barnewell v. Murrell, 108 Ala. 366, 18 S. 831
(1895).
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were present at the time of execution, absent contrary showing. Secondly, it is presumed that the will was executed in the form in which
it is found to exist at the death of the testator. It may readily be seen
that these presumptions give a forceful push toward the second step
of allowing integration.
Since the real intent of the Statute of Wills was to prevent fraud
in the execution of testamentary instruments, even the most liberal use
of extrinsic evidence to establish the real desire of a decedent seems
most justified. It has been suggested that the more mechanical tests
of physical connection or internal sense would prove a stumbling block
only to the very crude and very ignorant forger, in any case where one
sheet is substituted for another, and in the absence of fraud, the result
is to defeat the actual intent of the testator. 67 Thus, without a revamping of the Statute of Wills to require some absolute form of execution
involving a single sheet of paper, the admission of extrinsic evidence
in every case to show that the testator meant papers to be integrated
would appear reasonably justified. It would seem to be a most desirable outcome if all courts considering the problem of integration in
future cases were to abandon the use of exclusively mechanical tests,
and would, instead, permit extrinsic proof in every case to show the
intent of the testator, whether or not the mechanical tests are satisfied.

Robert t. Sandblom, S.Ed.
67

I PAGE, WII.LS §246 (1941).

